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7. The effects of private equity investors on 
the governance of companies
Stefano Bonini and Vincenzo Capizzi
INTRODUCTION
Companies that receive external equity typically experience a separation 
of ownership and control, where owners who are not involved in the 
company (principals) have to rely on the management team (agents) for 
achieving expected goals and target levels. Theoretical literature argues 
that when ownership and control are separated, principals develop 
governance structures to reduce agency costs and align agents’ incen-
tives (Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Grossman 
and Hart, 1986; Zingales, 1995). Likewise, optimal financial structure 
design by financial intermediaries can effectively help to mitigate agency 
problems by identifying self-enforcing equilibria (Diamond, 1984; Fama 
and Jensen, 1985; Stiglitz, 1985; Bhattacharya and Thakor, 1993; Barry, 
1994).
In general terms, governance and financial devices can be thought of as 
either internal control mechanisms (such as the board) or external control 
mechanisms (such as the market for corporate control). An increasingly 
important external control mechanism affecting the governance of young 
and fast-growing companies worldwide is the emergence of institutional 
and private equity investors, as equity owners. Institutional investors 
have the potential to influence management’s activities directly through 
their ownership, and indirectly by trading their shares (Gillan and Starks, 
2003). In this respect private equity investors are differentiated from insti-
tutional ones in the longer-term view and in the significantly more hands-
on approach that they pursue when investing in a portfolio company. As 
a result, companies backed by private equity investors represent a fruitful 
environment to investigate the use and efficiency of a multitude of control 
mechanisms.
The surge over the last 30 years in investment activity by private equity 
investors at large has given rise to an increased specialization of this class 
of investors conditional on the risk return profiles associated with differ-
ent investment and firm life cycle stages. For instance, business angels 
supporting the archetypical ‘paper company’ start-up face a risk  exposure 
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that in terms of both magnitude and characteristics is significantly 
 different from that incurred by a private equity investor acquiring control 
of a mature company. Yet, investors in this market share common traits 
such as a value maximization approach, risk‒return informed decisions, 
and a deep knowledge of governance mechanisms. As such their influence 
on portfolio company governance mechanisms is largely similar in terms 
of depth and breadth. In this chapter we aim at presenting an up-to-date 
review of the main theoretical contributions and empirical results in this 
active and growing field of research.
PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTORS: STAGE FOCUS AND 
INVOLVEMENT IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
A broad definition of private equity is the provision of capital by 
financial investors to high-growth, private companies (see the National 
Venture Capital Association, NVCA, and European Venture Capital 
Association, EVCA, guidelines). A more accurate definition identifies 
investors as either venture capital or, strictly speaking, private equity 
investors according to the stage of development of the target firm. In 
particular, formal venture capital (VC) is the provision of capital to 
young ventures in need of resources to start up, develop or expand a 
business by a professional investor. Formal venture capital, as part of 
the larger private equity model, is characterized by the separation of fund 
provisioning (largely restricted to the so-called ‘limited partners’) and the 
management of capital, normally mandated to a group of professional 
investors organized as a management company. However, as Bygrave 
et al. (2003) show, the overwhelming majority of capital provided by 
non-family members to young, high-growth companies is provided by 
so-called ‘informal venture capital’ sources, mainly through investors 
known as ‘business angels’. Crucially, business angels provide funding 
out of their own endowments rather than through external fundrais-
ing. A question still hotly debated in the literature is whether business 
angels (BAs) and venture capitalists are to be looked at as complements 
or substitutes. The general consensus seem to point at business angels, 
both as individuals and as organized groups of individuals (known as 
business angels groups), as precursors of proper venture capital inves-
tors, in that they target essentially only newborn firms in the seed phase 
of development and they adopt very similar valuation models, monitor-
ing structures and exit strategies. However a few recent contributions 
(most notably Hellmann et al., 2015) provide preliminary evidence of 
increased competition between these two classes of early-stage investors, 
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making them ‘dynamic complements’. We reckon that this is an area of 
fruitful research that, through the availability of more granular data on 
the financing sequencing of start-ups, will help to answer this pressing 
question.
Differently from formal or informal VC, strictly defined private equity 
is referred to as a later-stage type of organized investment that usually 
provides capital to support the buyout, further expansion or turnaround 
of an established company (EVCA, 2006). As such, PE investors target 
fast-growing companies that have unexploited potential that investors can 
unleash through the so-called ‘operational re-engineering’ and/or appro-
priate financial structuring.
A crucial characteristic of all these three forms of professional investors 
is the finite life of their holding periods: the main purpose of the invest-
ment is in fact to maximize the return on capital and sell the company 
to a later-stage investor or a private entity, or to the market through the 
listing of shares. This feature generates an endogenous incentive to exert 
strict control on the portfolio company through a variety of mechanisms, 
among which corporate governance control mechanisms are of the utmost 
importance. In fact, while sound governance may not necessarily lead to 
strong performance, there is an implicit understanding among the vast 
majority of investors that poorly governed companies are more prone to 
failure. Hence, there is a strong element of self-interest for private equity 
managers to ensure that their funds are invested only in well-governed 
companies or in companies that are willing and able to improve their 
governance, and to avoid investing in poorly governed companies that 
demonstrate no inclination to improve their governance.
Despite these common objectives, the different stages of development 
of the target firms and the different risk‒return profiles of the invest-
ment generate significantly different approaches in the implementation 
of control and monitoring procedures and, ultimately, in shaping the 
corporate governance of portfolio companies. In the following we present 
evidence on the impact of business angels, venture capitalists and later-
stage private equity investors on the governance of portfolio companies.
INFORMAL VENTURE CAPITAL AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE
The market for informal venture capital includes various typologies of 
investors, among which the most important are business angels, who 
are private investors providing finance to small and newly established 
companies with their own private savings by underwriting equity capital 
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(Sørheim and Landström, 2001). Differently from formal venture capital-
ist, it is often noted (e.g. Shane, 2008) that BAs’ objective function is two-
sided: on one hand they share with formal VC a value-maximization goal. 
On the other, though, there seems to be a significant component driving 
BA investment decisions provided by non-monetary benefits associated 
with prestige, visibility and involvement in successful ventures. As several 
authors note (Haines et al., 2003; Morrisette, 2007; Ibrahim, 2008; Hsu 
et al., 2014), there seem to be a strong component of personal reward moti-
vating business angels, such as playing an entrepreneurial role, mentoring 
highly talented and creative people, discovering new technologies, and 
interacting with other angels and players. In this respect, the contribution 
they provide to financed firms is at least as much related to knowledge, 
advice, mentoring and personal networks as to capital injection (Harrison 
and Mason, 1992; Landström, 1993; Politis, 2008).
From a research perspective BAs and venture capitalists have intuitive 
similarities and interesting differences. Crucially, both venture capitalists 
and BAs share a common approach to capital provision through direct 
equity underwriting which allows for the extension to BAs of much of the 
empirical evidence on the process and structure of venture capital invest-
ing. However, business angels differ deeply from formal venture capital-
ists in several respects. Firstly and probably most importantly, business 
angels invest their own capital and not funds committed by third parties 
through a closed-end fund vehicle (Freear et al., 1992; Coveney and 
Moore, 1998). This characteristic generates a higher risk exposure on the 
investor side and, arguably, a greater involvement in the investment selec-
tion and monitoring process. Secondly, business angels’ available funds 
are generally rather limited when compared to the average size of assets 
under management by venture capital firms. This generates an almost 
mechanical focus on smaller and younger companies with a steep growth 
potential. This evidence largely holds true despite a trend observed in 
recent years among business angels of syndicating investment to finance 
larger and more ‘developed’ projects (Harrison and Mason, 2000; Sohl 
and Hill, 2007). Thirdly, they have no or limited diversification strategies, 
nor do they commit themselves simultaneously to multiple investments, 
having as a major risk management technique the small proportion of 
invested capital over their total personal assets, which by construction 
should limit the impact of a negative performance on their net worth 
(Freear et al., 1992; Harrison and Mason, 1996; Van Osnabrugge, 2000; 
Johnson and Sohl, 2012; Capizzi, 2015). These differences suggest the 
existence of a complementarity, rather than a competition, between BAs 
and venture capitalists. According to data compiled by the United States 
(US) Angel Capital Association and reported in Table 7.1, there is a 
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striking evidence of similar capital contributions by angels and formal 
VC investors. However, business angels invest in about 16 times more 
companies than are financed by formal VC, and disproportionately in the 
seed and early-stage phase.
Given this evidence, it is not surprising that since the 1990s informal 
venture capitalists have tried to increase the quality of their operations 
by gathering in semi-formal associations or groups of angels, usually on a 
territorial or industrial basis, sharing presentation pitches from potential 
entrepreneurs, due diligence over the potential investment opportunities, 
transaction costs and investment deals to be implemented by syndicates of 
group members (Mason, 2006; Sohl, 2007; Paul and Whittam, 2010; Kerr 
et al., 2014a). These associations, called business angel networks (BANs), 
angel investment organizations (AIOs) or angel groups, have grown to 
regional levels (for example, Tech Coast Angels in southern California or 
CommonAngels in Massachusetts), national levels (for example, ACA in 
the US, BBAA in the United Kingdom, IBAN in Italy) and super-national 
levels (for example, EBAN in Europe).
This evidence notwithstanding, research on business angels and their 
impact on portfolio companies is still limited by significant data avail-
ability issues and is therefore mainly qualitative and largely incomplete. 
Yet, preliminary results seem suggestive of a different set of objectives 
and techniques than those observed in VC contracts (Landström, 2007). 
Venture capitalists typically address the problem of opportunistic behav-
ior of entrepreneurs – arising from uncertainty, information  asymmetries 
and agency costs faced by the outside equity investors – by:
Table 7.1 VC and BA investment activity
  Angel Investors Venture Capital
Invested capital $24.8 bn $29.6 bn
Number of investors 298 000 548
Total deals 71 000 4050
 Seed 32 000 120
 Early stage 29 000 1375
 Expansion 9200 2550
Note: This table provides summary statistics on the investment activity in start-up 
companies. Figures are for the fiscal year 2013 obtained by the National Venture Capital 
Association and the Angel Capital Association.
Source: Table compiled by the authors on US ACA data
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1.  Pooling the risks coming from many investments through a portfolio 
diversification approach.
2. Sharing the risks with other investors through a syndication approach.
3.  Designing investment contracts aimed at aligning inside and outside 
investors’ incentives. Such an alignment is obtained through a deal-
specific combination of five different mechanisms:
 a.  Staged financing, a funding mechanism conditioning the follow-
on investments to some pre-specified performance milestones to 
be reached over a given time period.
 b.  Dual class shares, aimed at providing a priority status to outside 
equity investors in case of payout policies and in case of a 
company sale, bankruptcy or liquidation.
 c. Board seats, allowing the VCs to exert control over the company.
 d.  Negative covenants (or veto rights), which are specific con-
tractual clauses aimed at preventing the target companies from 
implementing predetermined actions, operations or investments 
which could increase the equity risk for already existing outside 
investors.
 e.  Exit rights, including, but not limited to, redemption rights, ‘tag 
and drag along’ rights, demand registration rights, conversion 
rights.
Whether any of these techniques is actually adopted by business angels 
remains an opaque issue. Wong et al. (2009), in their seminal study, 
provide evidence on business angels’ contract design, looking at a sample 
of 215 angel investment rounds in 143 companies from across the United 
States during the period 1994‒2001. Their results show that angels are 
not given the traditional control rights that venture capitalists typically 
use. Rather, one of the primary mechanisms to control agency costs is the 
alignment of the entrepreneur’s interests with those of the firm through the 
large ownership positions. Additionally, angels make smaller investments 
and increase syndication when investing in the riskier ventures. Wong 
et al. (2009) provide a tentative answer to the puzzling question as to why 
angels provide capital in highly uncertain operations without much formal 
protection from expropriation. In particular, Wong et al. (2009) argue that 
a proximity effect plays a role: angels tend to invest in ventures located 
very closely to their home base. Therefore they can engage in direct moni-
toring and indirect network monitoring in a spirit similar to Sorenson and 
Stuart (2001). This effect is reinforced by business angels who generally 
invest in ventures operating in businesses which the investor is extremely 
familiar with due to prior or current experience.
BAs invest in the very first stages of the firm life where the issues of 
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uncertainty, information asymmetries and agency costs are the highest. 
Yet, Ibrahim’s (2008) evidence provides additional support to Wong et al.’s 
(2009) results showing that their typical investment contracts very seldom 
show the adoption of the standard VC control and governance provisions. 
As Ibrahim puts it, ‘[BA contracts] are surprisingly non aggressive and 
striking in their informality’, with a puzzling lack of contractual protection.
Ibrahim proposes three major arguments to explain these observed dif-
ferences. First, angel investors anticipate that as the company grows and 
increases the unit size of its operating investments, it will become eligible for 
a follow-up financing round by a formal venture capital fund. In such a case, 
a formal VC investor, as illustrated above, would inevitably require appro-
priate control and governance tools that would make a prior contract design 
by a business angel either too binding (thereby potentially unraveling the 
deal) or simply of limited use and therefore a loss-making investment, as sug-
gested also by Gompers and Lerner (2006) in the VC context. This implies 
that ‘the start-up’s need for further funding from venture capitalists sets de 
facto limits on the terms of the angel investment contract’ (Ibrahim, 2008).
Second, Ibrahim (2008) suggests that some informal substitutes for con-
tractual monitoring are available to business angels. In particular, aligned 
with Wong et al.’s (2009) networking conjecture, Ibrahim (2008) shows 
that angel investors tend to join start-ups either operating in industries they 
know because of their their past personal experience, or controlled by entre-
preneurs they are familiar with. Finally, as previously noted by Wong et al. 
(2009), BAs invest in start-ups geographically close to the BA’s location, 
thus building trust, and offering mentoring and leverage on the BA network.
Elaborating on the network argument, Ibrahim (2008) also introduces 
the evolving trend in angel financing toward structured or semi-structured 
angel investment organizations (AIOs). These networks provide angels with 
a valuable set of opportunities at reduced costs, including a constant stream 
of deal flow, joint valuation, due diligence and legal advisory services, train-
ing courses, interaction with other investors and the chance to participate 
to larger deals through the syndication mechanism. However, the more 
investors organize as semi-formal venture capital investment companies, 
the less AIO angels can leverage on informal substitutes for monitoring. 
As a consequence, the progressive institutionalization and formalization of 
angel investing may lead to an increase in the use of structured contractual 
mechanisms to minimize information asymmetries and agency costs.
In a recent contribution on this topic, Kerr et al. (2014a) investigate 
whether and how entrepreneurial financiers affect the success and growth 
of new ventures. Despite not providing specific evidence on the effects on 
governance practices of target companies, Kerr et al. (2014a) show that 
angel groups exhibit much more structured investment selection processes 
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and that the level of favorable review of the investment proposal, initial 
presentation and due diligence at the group rather than individual level is 
strongly predictive of investment success. Kerr et al. (2014a) additionally 
show that receiving financing from a group, as opposed to a single angel 
investor, is associated with improved likelihood of survival for four or 
more years, higher levels of employment and more visibility in the market. 
However, Kerr et al. (2014a) also show that with regard to the role of 
angel funding in facilitating access to future formal venture capital financ-
ing, the evidence is mixed: on one hand, strongly positive prospects are sig-
nificantly more likely to receive follow-on financing rounds. On the other 
hand, however, the evidence quickly decreases for less positively evaluated 
projects that still received angel group financing.
Chua and Wu (2012) provide explicit, valuable evidence of the effects 
of post-investment involvement (PII) of BAs in invested companies. Their 
research design looks at both the characteristics of PII and the effects on 
performance. Chua and Wu’s (2012) empirical analysis builds on a new 
survey-based dataset provided by the Kauffmann Foundation of 539 BAs, 
affiliated to 86 BANs in North America that recorded 1137 exits from 
their angel investments. The results show that PII has a significant posi-
tive effect on the returns (internal rate of return, IRR) earned by angels 
on their venture investments. However, such returns seem to be more sig-
nificantly associated to mentoring and value-adding activities, rather than 
‘standard’ monitoring activities such as serving on the board, designing 
the strategy and provide additional financing rounds (similarly to Kerr 
et al., 2014b). These results are aligned with those documented by Capizzi 
(2015) on one of the first panel data large samples of angel investments.
VENTURE CAPITAL AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE
Venture capital deals are primarily characterized by asymmetric informa-
tion between entrepreneurs and financiers and almost exclusive capital 
infusion by outsiders. In such a context, Gorman and Sahlman (1989) 
and Sahlman (1990) first suggested that the value of VC lies not only in 
providing capital but also in superior selectivity by consistently picking 
high-growth firms, and most importantly in the provision of supplemen-
tary services such as entrepreneurial advice, hiring executives and shaping 
strategy, resulting in a valuable professionalization of portfolio compa-
nies. Following these seminal contributions, a large number of studies 
have investigated the mechanisms adopted by VCs to mitigate principal‒
agent conflicts, identifying three broad classes of control mechanisms: 
M4244-GABRIELSSON_TEXT.indd   171 21/04/2017   12:11
172  Handbook of research on corporate governance and entrepreneurship
intense pre-investment screening, the development of accurate financ-
ing contracts, and continuous post-investment monitoring and advice. 
Admati and Pfleiderer (1994), Lerner (1994) and Hochberg et al. (2004) 
shed light on pre-investment screening and syndication. Sahlman (1990), 
Berglof (1994), Gompers (1995) and Bergmann and Hege (1998) provide 
extensive evidence on the increasing level of complexity in the design of 
VC financing contracts through the introduction of staging, monitor-
ing, governance and exit rules. Cumming (2005) supports this evidence 
by showing that agency problems can be explicitly addressed by appro-
priate security design and that the degree of contractual sophistication 
changes over time due to learning effects. A stream of research has given 
specific attention to the valuable activities performed by venture capital-
ists beyond their financing function. In particular, value-added tasks of 
venture capitalists include helping firms to shape strategies, and providing 
technical and commercial advice (Bygrave and Timmons, 1992; Hellmann, 
1998; Hellmann and Puri, 2002; Baker and Gompers, 2003; Cornelli and 
Yosha, 2003). These contributions paved the way to answering a second 
set of questions, that is, the extent of VC influence on the governance of 
firms, the channels through which these effects are transmitted to portfolio 
companies, and the ultimate effects on corporate performance.
The Extent of VC Influence on the Governance of Firms
Fama and Jensen (1983) and Williamson (1983), first conjectured that 
the composition of the board should be shaped by the need for oversight. 
Lerner (1995) tests this intuition in the VC industry by looking at board 
representation of portfolio companies. Assuming that venture capitalists 
are significant providers of managerial oversight, their representation on 
boards should be larger when there is a greater need for oversight. His 
findings show that venture capitalists are more likely to join or be added 
to the boards of private companies in periods when the chiefe executive 
officer (CEO) of the company changes. Baker and Gompers (1999) focus 
on board composition at initial public offerings (IPOs). They argue that 
the optimal choice for board structure is made at the time of the IPO, 
since existing shareholders bear the cost of suboptimal governance. Using 
data from 1116 IPO prospectuses, they describe board size and compo-
sition for a set of firms with a median age of less than six years and a 
median equity capitalization of $42 million. According to their analysis, 
the number of insiders is 27 percent smaller in VC-backed firms, and 
the number of instrumental directors is 20 percent smaller. Kroszner 
and Strahan (2001), using banks’ board representation, obtain similar 
results. Hellmann and Puri (2002) provide additional insights on a set of 
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 governance actions in a hand-collected survey sample of 149 start-ups in 
Silicon Valley. The authors show that venture capitalists are influential 
not only at the top of the organization, in terms of replacing the original 
founders with an outside CEO as in Lerner (1995), but also in develop-
ments further down the organization. Differently from previous studies, 
Kaplan and Stromberg (2000, 2003, 2004) document direct evidence on 
venture capitalist actions and monitoring. Analyzing investment decisions 
on portfolio companies at the time of the initial investment, they find that 
while in 14 percent of the investments the venture capitalists play an active 
role in advising the management, they trade off this activity with the costs 
of devoting excessive attention to a single venture.
Hochberg (2004) compares governance in VC-backed and non-VC-
backed IPO firms using a unique database assembled by supplementing 
data from four publicly available databases with additional information 
gathered from two hand-collected datasets. Results show that VC backing 
reduces the level of earnings management in the firm (as proxied for by 
discretionary accruals); furthermore, VC-backed firms are more likely to 
follow ‘conservative’ rather than ‘aggressive’1 accounting practices than 
non-VC-backed firms. Additionally, VC-backed firms experience higher 
abnormal returns than non-VC-backed firms upon the announcement of 
the adoption of a shareholder rights agreement, and have more independ-
ent board structures at the time of the IPO. In a similar set-up, Suchard 
(2009) explores the effect of VC backing on the size and composition of 
the board of directors of investees at the time of the IPO, showing that 
venture capitalists are influential in determining the number of board 
members and in appointing independent directors with substantial indus-
try-related skills. Cumming (2008) addresses the issue of the governance of 
VC-backed companies conditional on the legal and economic framework. 
The results, although focused on a broad set of corporate variables relat-
ing to governance style by VC investors, offer a first hint at the existence 
of profound differences in the governance choices by VC investors condi-
tional on their geographical origins.
The Transmission Channels of the VC Influence on the Governance of 
Firms
These contributions confirm the intuition that venture capitalists do 
affect the governance of their portfolio companies by intense monitoring, 
 providing advice, shaping strategies and accelerating companies growth. 
The existence of causal links calls for understanding the transmission 
channels through which venture capitalists exert their influence on the 
 governance of their firms.
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Several contributions have identified the investment size as a relevant 
factor in the selection and management process of VC-backed companies. 
Kanniainen and Keuschnigg (2003, 2004) and Bernile et al. (2007) show 
that since the size of a VC management company cannot be easily scaled 
to the number of ventures in its portfolio, the screening, monitoring and 
advice activity of that management company is upper bounded. As a 
consequence, VC investors will optimize their available time and effort 
by carefully selecting the size of the portfolio (number of investments) 
to achieve optimal passive diversification, and the stake in each venture, 
in order to optimally allocate their monitoring (scarce) resources. The 
latter decision can be also interpreted as a diversification effect as venture 
capitalists will devote more resources to projects where they have larger 
interests, and accept more risks on projects where they have smaller 
stakes (Jääskeläinen et al., 2006). Bernile et al. (2007) test this empirical 
prediction on a survey-based sample of 42 VC-backed companies. Their 
results confirm the theoretical model, showing that VC investors jointly 
optimize the size of the portfolio and the relative weight of each invest-
ment. Cumming (2006) addresses the portfolio size issue, showing that 
additional factors such as industry, stage, syndication and geographical 
region contribute to the portfolio size selection.
Bonini et al. (2012) provide a specific set of tests on the correlation 
between the amount of VC funding in a company and the venture capital-
ist’s influence on the governance practices. In particular, their main tests 
aim at identifying a causal relationship between the VC investment size and 
the effect on governance practices at the top of the company and across 
the whole organization. Looking at data from a novel hand- collected, 
questionnaire-based survey sample of 164 VC-backed companies in the 
US and Europe, they gather information on top-management and organ-
ization-wide variables that they then relate to investment size and a set of 
control variables. All variables are operationalized as Likert-type items 
with values ranging from 1 to 4, where 1 indicates no VC influence, and 4 
indicates high VC influence, with the exception of CEO-replaced which is 
a dichotomous item. Variables are modeled as follows:
● Top-management items: CEO-replaced, CEO hiring (CEO), 
Executive compensation (EXE), Board decisions (BODD), Board 
appointments (BODA).
● Organization-wide variables: HR practices (HR), Employee incentives 
(INCENT), Strategy direction (STR), Investment planning (INV).
Table 7.2 reports results for a set of univariate and multivariate OLS 
regressions.
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The percentage of VC funding is statistically significant in explain-
ing the variance in venture capitalists’ influence in some governance 
structures: as the percentage of funding increases, venture capitalists’ 
influence on CEO hiring, executive compensation, employees’ incentives, 
board decisions and board appointments grows accordingly. As shown 
by Gompers (1995), VC investors frequently require seats on the board 
of directors of portfolio companies as a monitoring covenant, since this 
allows better access to information and ongoing oversight on managerial 
decision-making. Confirming this preliminary evidence, results show that 
the proportion of funding and influence on board decisions and appoint-
ments is highly significant (b 5 0.662, p < 0.01 and b 5 0.852, p < 0.001).
VC is a well-known case of a principal‒agent problem where the 
venture capitalist as a principal is exposed to large moral hazard issues 
not only by the entrepreneurs but also by a larger workforce which can 
be critical to the success of the venture. In such a case incentive alignment 
mechanisms such as profit sharing and pay-per-performance plan can be 
useful in reducing risk. The EXE and INCENT models confirm this intui-
tion, showing increasing effects the larger the investment by the venture 
capitalist.
Given the categorical nature of the survey response variables, Bonini 
et al. (2012) perform appropriate ordinal logistic tests to overcome the 
problems highlighted by Menard (1995) in adopting linear approaches in 
a non-linear context. Results reported in Table 7.3 are aligned with those 
obtained in ordinary least squares (OLS) specifications.
As expected, significance increases both for the overall model and for 
the single estimated parameters. Figure 7.1 provides a graphical inter-
pretation of the O-logit results plotting the predicted probabilities for the 
extreme response categories (1 5 ‘No or low influence’ and 4 5 ‘High 
influence’) for the four most significant dependent variables, namely: CEO 
hiring (CEO), Executive compensation (EXE), Board of Directors decisions 
(BODD) and Board of Directors appointment (BODA).
The dashed lines graph the predicted probabilities for the response cate-
gory 1 for each variable while the solid lines graph the predicted probabili-
ties for the response category 4. Estimations are computed for changes in 
the VC ownership stake keeping all other variables constant at their mean 
values. Due to the non-linear nature of categorical models the interpreta-
tion of this graph is not straightforward: each line represent the predicted 
probabilities of observing a high or low influence of the amount of VC 
invested on the selected independent variable. For instance, when the VC 
stake is at its mean value of 70.35 percent looking at the effect on board 
of directors appointment, the model predicts a probability of recording a 
high influence slightly below 60 percent compared with a probability for a 
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low influence of less than 5 percent. Probabilities are increasing in the VC 
amount for the high category and decreasing for the low one.
VC Influence on Governance and Financial Performance of Portfolio Firms
The previous results clearly illustrate the existence of strong influence 
by VC investors on the design of governance mechanisms within firms. 
A connected question is whether more elaborated governance structures 
also lead to superior financial performance. Farag et al. (2014) tackle this 
issue by looking at VC-backed firms listing on the United Kingdom (UK) 
Alternative Investment Market (AIM). Given the extensive set of possible 
governance variables, Farag et al. (2014) develop an ad hoc comprehensive 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Pr
ed
ict
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lity
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
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Note:  This figure plots predicted probabilities for the four dependent variables significant 
at the 1% level or more from the full-sample ordinal logistic regression reported in 
Table 3. The four variables are: influence on CEO hiring (CEO), influence on Executive 
compensation (EXE), influence on Board of directors decisions (BODD) and influence on 
Board of directrors appointment (BODA). The dashed lines plot the predicted probabilities 
for the ‘No or low influence’ outcome (i.e. response category 5 1), while the solid lines 
report the predicted probabilities associated with the ‘High influence’ outcome (i.e. 
response category 5 4). Predicted probabilities are computed setting all other variables at 
their mean values. The vertical line reports the mean level of VC contribution.
Source: Based on Bonini et al. (2012)
Figure 7.1  Full sample predicted probabilities
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corporate governance (CG) measure: the CGAIM50 Index. This index is 
obtained by aggregating 50 governance items. Each item is modeled as a 
dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the item is found as being present 
in the observed firm and 0 otherwise. All items are then equally weighted 
to avoid any potential scoring and scaling biases to yield a final score that 
ranges between 0 and 1. A company with a sophisticated and articulated 
governance structure would exhibit a CG index close to 1 as opposed to a 
weakly governed firm that would rank not far from 0.
Farag et al. (2014) conjecture that VC ownership leads to superior 
governance which in turn leads to superior financial performance. Given 
the potentially severe endogeneity and simultaneity issues they adopt a 
three-stage least squares model and an alternative generalized method of 
moments (GMM) specification to cross-validate the results.
The first step in their approach is to design the following set of simulta-
neous equations:
 Governance 5 f(Ownership, Performance, X, e1)
 Ownership 5 f(Governance, Performance, X, e2)
 Performance 5 f(Ownership, Governance, X, e3)
where X is a vector of control variables.
To empirically establish the dynamic relationship between corporate 
governance, VC ownership structure and financial performance of AIM 
companies, Farag et al. (2014) run a three-stage least squares (3SLS) 
model to estimate the previous equations jointly within a system of simul-
taneous equations in which they are treated as endogenous variables. The 
essential advantage of the 3SLS estimation technique is that it allows not 
only for simultaneity among corporate governance, VC ownership and 
financial performance, but also for correlations among the error compo-
nents. As a robustness check the authors estimate also simpler 2SLS and 
OLS models. Results of this exercise are reported in Table 7.4.
Panel A shows that there is a positive and significant relationship 
between governance characteristics and both the percentage of VC own-
ership and financial performance. Panel B reveals a positive and sig-
nificant relationship between governance characteristics and financial 
performance; however there is no significant relationship between VC 
ownership and financial performance. This result supports the conjec-
ture that causality flows from VC ownership to governance and that 
better governance translates into superior financial performance. Finally, 
the results reported in panel C show that there is no direct relationship 
between VC ownership and both financial performance and corporate 
governance. Their findings can be interpreted as follows: companies with 
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better  financial performance are keen to develop their governance mecha-
nism and characteristics through employing high-profile and experienced 
directors, in particular non-executive directors. Similarly, companies with 
better corporate governance characteristics have better-quality manage-
ment and this is reflected in the decision-making process and thus the 
overall financial performance of the firm.
PRIVATE EQUITY AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE
Many academics and practitioners have argued that the success of private 
equity-backed buyouts stems in part from a more effective corporate gov-
ernance structure implemented after a company is acquired. Most obvi-
ously, ownership changes from a dispersed base of public shareholders, 
none of which may have adequate incentives to participate fully in govern-
ance, to a small number (often one) of buyout funds whose own success 
and remuneration depends on the returns provided by their investments 
and which are thus highly motivated to maximize value.
Several studies have examined governance features of companies with 
private equity (PE) or specifically buyout fund sponsorship to determine 
the extent to which governance structures indeed differ between these com-
panies and companies without a professional investor sponsorship. The 
features that are typical of private company governance, such as small, 
engaged boards and high pay‒performance sensitivity, can be adopted by 
public as well as private companies but they may appear redundant for 
the case of concentrated private ownership that characterizes PE deals. 
Accordingly, private equity sponsors – given their own performance-based 
compensation and retained equity stakes – may implement less of these 
features in their portfolio companies. A rival conjecture though might be 
that given that exits are mainly expected through IPOs, PE-backed firms 
may align to best practices related to board independence and dilution 
from equity compensation plans to attract investors who, as minority 
shareholders, attach significant value to governance mechanisms. The 
relevance of these questions in terms of economic and welfare effects has 
spurred a number of studies investigating the effects of PE sponsors on 
several governance structures.
Private Equity and CEO and Management Turnover
According to agency theory, companies with a high level of undistributed 
free cash and a low level of leverage suffer from severe agency problems, 
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among which are CEOs enjoying private benefits and engaging in ‘empire 
building’ activities. Jensen (1989) argues that private equity buyouts are a 
form of governance mechanism that addresses the inefficiencies observed 
in companies that have incurred agency costs beyond an equilibrium 
point. In particular, PE firms investing in companies characterized by sig-
nificant agency costs are more likely to remove incumbent CEOs. In such 
a case, the CEO replacement, firm restructuring and eventual firm sale ‒ in 
short, the PE intervention ‒ generates value for the economy as a whole, 
and in particular for minority shareholders.
Many studies (among others, Baker and Wruck, 1989; Lehn and 
Poulsen, 1989; Leslie and Oyer, 2009), have addressed the interven-
tion channels of PE sponsors at the operating level, through the imple-
mentation of so-called operational re-engineering strategies; and at the 
incentive mechanism level, through the design and enforcement of pay-
per- performance compensation schemes at multiple organization levels. 
Surprisingly, though, few studies have specifically looked into the differ-
ential degree of CEO turnover in PE-backed companies.
Gong and Wu (2011) filled the gap by looking at a US sample of 126 
PE-sponsored leveraged buyouts (LBOs)2 that occurred between 1998 and 
2006. A methodological issue affecting the size of the sample is that when 
gathering buyout data, all MBOs have to be excluded, in that MBOs are 
almost always initiated by the former management led by the pre-buyout 
CEO, thus determining a sharp decline in available data points. Gong and 
Wu’s (2011) results indicate an unconditional CEO replacement probabil-
ity of 51 percent, which strikingly exceeds by a factor of five the market 
average replacement rate of 11 percent documented by Parrino (1997) 
and Farrell and Whidbee (2003). Moving to a standard logistic regres-
sion approach they include in the analysis a set of important agency cost 
controls.
Results reported in Table 7.5 show that some sources of agency costs 
appear to have a meaningful and large effect on the likelihood of observ-
ing a CEO replacement. In particular, leverage is strongly negatively 
related to CEO turnover, providing a confirmation of Jensen’s (1986) 
hypothesis: debt acts as a disciplining mechanisms for CEOs. Since lever-
age is by and large determined by managerial discretion, a new owner will 
most likely face a conflict with the incumbent CEO who chose a subop-
timal capital structure and this will generate an almost mechanical pres-
sure for CEO replacement. In a similar spirit we can interpret the positive 
coefficient of the free cash flow. Very interestingly the strongly significant, 
very large and negative coefficient for return on assets (ROA), a measure 
of the efficiency in asset exploitation, indicates that the company was 
underperforming its peers, most likely due to agency costs. A comforting 
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result from a welfare perspective is the very weak effect of the experience 
or quality of the PE sponsor on the replacement likelihood. The sign of the 
parameter is positive but most often insignificant, meaning that one can 
expect the average PE fund to recognize inefficiencies and, following an 
investment, address them through appropriate actions.
Supporting these results, Cornelli and Karakas (2014) show that fol-
lowing CEO replacement the turnaround of CEOs in PE-backed firms 
is essentially null, which again compares with an unconditional expected 
replacement rate of 11 percent for the market. This result suggests that by 
actively intervening in companies characterized by an abnormal level of 
agency costs, private equity investors alleviate board myopia and generate 
value for all stakeholders.
Private Equity and Boards
The role of boards in public companies is to provide management supervi-
sion in the presence of fragmented shareholders and in particular of small, 
minority investors who express a need for protection. However, firms 
acquired by private equity firms lack this characteristic, as the rationale 
often given for the success of private equity is exactly that it concentrates 
the ownership in the hands of few shareholders, allowing direct, more 
efficient control. In such respect the intervention of a PE investor may 
significantly alter the composition and powers of the board of a company. 
In particular, because PE investors could provide advice and monitor-
ing without a board, one could argue that boards may be considerably 
diminished in terms of both size and powers. A counter-argument though 
is that, as Lerner (1995) showed for VC firms, investors tend to exert 
their influence by taking board seats. Following this analogy, one could 
expect boards to be vastly dominated by PE members empowered with 
superior, direct monitoring and that independent directors would essen-
tially be absent. These arguments suggest that there is a clear rationale for 
expecting board composition and powers to be significantly different in 
PE-backed firms.
In a seminal study Gertner and Kaplan (1996) explored this question by 
comparing board characteristics of 59 companies target of a reverse-LBO 
with a sample of industry and size matched peers. The authors found that 
the reverse-LBO companies’ boards were smaller, owned more equity and 
met less frequently. At the director level, boards were younger, directors 
had served for shorter time periods, were less likely to be women and 
were at least as likely to serve on other boards. This preliminary evidence 
has been complemented by Cao (2008) who examined post-IPO owner-
ship by buyout sponsors and insiders and governance characteristics in 
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a sample of reverse-LBO companies between 1981 and 2006. Cao shows 
that buyout sponsors’ ownership drops from 60 percent equity ownership 
to 40 percent immediately following the IPO. However, the residual stake 
diminishes only slowly over time to an average of 24 percent three years 
after the IPO. Importantly, however, Cao finds that buyout sponsors 
continue to be active investors after the IPO, in that they retain significant 
control of board and board committees. In particular, Cao’s results indi-
cate that buyout sponsors retain control over compensation and nominat-
ing committees disproportionately to their ownership stakes.
Cornelli and Karakas (2014) address this compelling research ques-
tion by looking at a sample of 142 public-to-private transactions in the 
UK between 1998 and 2003. Out of this initial sample, 88 deals are pure 
PE-sponsored transactions and are compared with other transactions 
where there was no involvement of a PE firm. Their analysis yields a 
number of results. First, the presence of a PE sponsor is not significantly 
related with a change in board size: both sponsored and unsponsored 
 public-to-private transactions experience a drop in board size by about 
two units from an unconditional mean of 6.5. However, experience 
matters in that PE-backed deals where the PE sponsor has considerable 
experience (this variable also partially captures reputation) experience a 
much bigger shrinkage in board size. In a way, experienced PE seems to be 
taking a more direct, hands-on approach, and almost exclusive manage-
ment of the company. Supporting this view, Cornelli and Karakas (2014) 
show that independent directors practically disappear from boards after 
the company has been taken private.
Private Equity and Takeover Defenses
An issue of hot debate is the perception by non-PE investors that post-
IPO PE firms tend to maintain disproportionate control rights through a 
plethora of mechanisms to the disadvantage of investors at large. When 
a portfolio company completes an IPO, the buyout fund sponsor usually 
does not dispose of its entire investment in the offering; instead, it retains 
an equity stake, which diminishes over time. For example, sponsors of 
a ‘vote no’ campaign against directors at Safeway in 2004 objected to 
the presence on Safeway’s board of four directors affiliated with buyout 
sponsor KKR, which owned only 9 percent of Safeway’s shares, as 
well as the existence of related-party transactions involving KKR. An 
open question is therefore whether PE-backed firms exhibit stronger 
and more articulated anti-takeover practices and whether these add or 
destroy value.
Klausner (2003), building on survey data from the Investor Responsibility 
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Research Center (IRRC), unveiled the striking effect of PE investors in 
introducing and maintaining anti-takeover provisions in newly listed 
PE-backed companies. Klausner (2003) first notices the booming share 
of PE-backed firms in the IPO market that went from a few percentage 
points in the early 1980s to about 40 percent by the end of the century. 
In the same time frame IRRC data reported in Bebchuck (2003) show a 
spectacular increase in the presence of anti-takeover provisions at the time 
of the IPO. For instance, classified boards went from being present in 36.2 
percent of the newly listed firms in the period 1988‒92 to more than 82 
percent in 1999. Similarly, provisions limiting the right to call for special 
meeting skyrocketed from 12.4 percent to 84.8 percent of the cases.
Barret et al. (2009) in a follow-up IRRC-sponsored study show that, 
despite harsh criticism by shareholders and advocates of corporate gov-
ernance practices, this phenomenon has continued. In their study, Barret 
et al. (2009) show that IPO companies backed by buyout funds had sig-
nificantly stronger takeover defenses than companies brought public by 
non-private-equity sponsors. Additionally, companies backed by buyout 
funds were more likely than others to have classified boards, ‘poison pills’, 
and restrictions on director removal by shareholders.
A recent report (WilmerHale, 2014) on IPO data between 2007 and 
2012 compiled by WilmerHale, a large law data provider, provides an 
effective overview of this phenomenon. As reported in Table 7.6, PE (and 
VC) funds introduce strong anti-takeover provisions in their portfolio 
company charters, with classified boards, supermajority and exclusive 
forum defense mechanisms showing the largest difference with non-PE-
sponsored firms.
The prevailing view seems to be that anti-takeover provisions reduce 
shareholder value, and are meant only to entrench existing firm manage-
ment, allowing them to maintain control and extract private benefits of 
control. This entrenchment hypothesis has been partially supported by 
Daines and Klausner (2001). In an important paper, Field and Karpoff 
(2002), in contrast to this view, did not find evidence of poorer perfor-
mance conditional on the presence of takeover defenses. Chemmanur 
and Jiao (2005) addressed this empirical puzzle by proposing a model 
in which, in the presence of asymmetric information, takeover defenses 
allow managers to engage in riskier but value-creating long-term projects 
that could not be pursued if the company could easily be target to a proxy 
contest. Chemmanur and Jiao’s (2005) model goes further in showing 
that their results hold conditional on managers’ quality: when managers 
exhibit high quality the expected effect on performance is positive and 
large. Conversely, if managers are of low quality, anti-takeover provi-
sions destroy value because they generate inefficient investment decisions. 
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Consequently, the model predicts that highly reputable managers are 
more likely to put defense mechanisms into place so that they can pursue 
longer-term, value-creating strategies. Since a building block of PE firms 
is that they provide not only capital but also valuable managerial skills, 
the evidence that PE firms exhibit stronger defense mechanisms seems to 
confirm Chemmanur and Jiao’s (2005) model. This hypothesis implies 
that firms with strong protection provisions and high-quality managers 
should exhibit superior performance. In a follow-up study, Chemmanur et 
al. (2011) answer this question by looking at a large sample of IPOs from 
1993 to 2000. They define management quality through eight different 
dimensions: managerial team size; education; professional  certification; 
prior experience; prior experience in a law or accounting firm; CEO 
dominance; length of tenure; and tenure heterogeneity across team 
members. However, given that each measure may have unique limitations 
as a measure of the underlying unobservable construct, they develop an 
Table 7.6 Anti-takeover provision in IPO companies
  All IPO 
companies 
(%)
VC-backed 
(%)
PE-backed 
(%)
Other IPO 
companies 
(%)
Classified board 72 83 72 48
Supermajority voting  
  requirements to approve 
mergers or change corporate 
charter and bylaws
62 72 65 37
Prohibition of stockholders’  
  right to act by written 
consent
83 91 84 64
Limitation of stockholder?  
  right to call special meetings
89 94 94 73
Advance notice provisions 93 96 95 86
Section 203 of the Delaware  
 corporation statute
79 95 51 76
Blank check preferred stock 94 96 98 84
Multi-class capital structure  7  7  4 10
Exclusive forum provisions 27 22 44 14
Stockholders rights plan  2  4  1  2
Note: This table reports the fraction of IPO companies exhibiting an anti-takeover 
provision at the time of the IPO. Data are compiled from SEC filings from 2007 to 2012 for 
US issuers.
Source: Based on WilmerHale (2014)
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 aggregate, principal components quality score that captures the overall 
management quality and is increasing in it.
Their comprehensive results robustly show that the abnormal holding 
period returns of IPO firms with stronger anti-takeover protection are 
significantly larger than those of IPO firms with weaker anti-takeover 
protection. The differences in mean abnormal holding period returns are 
statistically significant at conventional levels and hold across a number 
of robustness tests. In particular, despite IPOs’ performance being gener-
ally lower than the benchmark as already pointed out by Ritter (1991), 
Loughran and Ritter (1995), Brav and Gompers (1997) and Teoh et al. 
(1998), firms with high-quality managers and strong anti-takeover provi-
sions significantly mitigate such an endogenous downward bias and align 
more to the benchmark. In a recent paper Karpoff et al. (2015) further 
extend this evidence, providing alternative interpretations of the transmis-
sion channel that allows anti-takeover provisions to generate value. In 
particular, they argue and show that firm stability in the absence of an 
external risk of takeover allows the generation of valuable relationships 
with the economic environment (the bonding hypothesis) that ultimately 
translate into superior performance.
CONCLUSIONS
Private equity investors have risen to be one of the most notable forces 
shaping corporate governance practices in young and fast-growing com-
panies as well as in established market players. The significantly increasing 
volume of investment has given rise to multiple classes of investors special-
ized in different stages of the life of a company. As such, the market is now 
populated by business angels, venture capitalists and later-stage private 
equity investors. This specialization has also contributed to shape differ-
ent practices, including the extent and design of corporate governance 
practice in portfolio companies. Surprisingly, the literature on this topic is 
fairly recent and relatively preliminary, and several questions are still unan-
swered. First, despite business angels being an investor class comparable 
to formal venture capital in terms of invested capital, little is known about 
the performance of their investments, the characteristics of the investment 
decision process and the governance of portfolio companies. Second, 
there is a wide gap in our understanding of the links between informal 
and formal venture capital. Since informal venture capital appears to be 
an obvious precursor (or pre-screening device) for formal venture capital-
ists, it would be natural to observe significant connections between angel 
investors and proper venture capital funds, and  considerably higher rates 
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of success in securing follow-up investments by business angel-sponsored 
firms. None of these expected links is robustly observed. Confirming this 
apparent puzzle and understanding its drivers are crucial in advancing our 
knowledge of the development of entrepreneurial activity. Third, there is 
still ambiguous evidence on the effects of anti-takeover and protection 
mechanisms in PE-backed deals. While there is a clear, general consensus 
on limiting these practices, there is also a striking and puzzling evidence of 
the widespread adoption of such provisions in firms controlled by private 
equity investors. Whether this is beneficial or detrimental to firms, stake-
holders and the market at large is largely an open question. We envision 
these to be fruitful areas for future research.
NOTES
1. The definition of ‘aggressive’ versus ‘conservative’ accounting practices is the one 
adopted by Hochberg (2004) and Teoh et al. (1998), who consider accounting policies 
as ‘aggressive’ when characterized by higher discretionary accruals, as opposed to lower 
discretionary accruals for ‘conservative’ policies.
2. A leveraged buy-out (LBO) is a type of acquisition by a financial investor that relies sig-
nificantly on external debt financing. A special class of LBO is the management buy-out 
(MBO), an LBO initiated by the existing management team that seeks support of a 
financial sponsor to buy out the company from its existing shareholders.
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